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On 10 December 2017, the UK registered ro-ro passenger ferry Pride of Kent struck a jetty and then grounded while departing Calais, France. The ferry was re-floated later that day and subsequently moved to a berth where the passengers disembarked. The ferry’s starboard propeller and tail-shaft were damaged and required repair in dry dock. The jetty was also damaged. There were no injuries to crew or passengers and no pollution.
control of the ferry during the turn towards the harbour entrance was lost due to the fast rate of turn, strong gale-force winds, use of full rudder and propeller pitch, and the tripping of one of the ferry’s bow thrusters the omission of a departure briefing to the bridge team Continue reading “Pride of Kent report published by MAIB”
On the evening of 24 March 2018, the Warrington Rowing Club was carrying out a boat capsize drill in a swimming pool. At around 1830, as a young person was being pulled to the side of the pool using a throw bag rescue line, the line parted. The young person was uninjured during the incident. The parted line was examined and found to be made up of four pieces of rope thermally fused together, and it had failed at one of the joints. A customer notification campaign by the manufacturer, RIBER, and prompt publication of the incident in British Rowing’s newsletter, identified a total of ten throw bags with defective rescue lines. Laboratory tests conducted for the MAIB established that the joined sections were 12 times weaker than the rope itself.
A crewman from the Liberian registered general cargo vessel, SMN Explorer, died when he was crushed by a falling hatch cover. The crewman was part of a working party stowing cargo slings used for the discharge of the ship’s cargo. The accident occurred when the crewman climbed up the inside of the open hatch cover after its locking pins had been removed.
The accident was the result of procedural inadequacies and a lapse of supervision. The investigation identified that the vessel’s safety management system was immature and the safety culture on board the vessel was weak. Risk assessments had not been conducted for routine tasks and a safe system of work had not been developed for opening and closing the forecastle (fo’c’s’le) stowage space hatch cover.