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As part of its work to make ships mooring safer, IMO’s Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction (SDC 6), which took place on 4-8 February 2019, has introduced new requirements for appropriate and safe-to-use designs of mooring arrangements, a maintenance and inspection regime, as well as proper documentation.
The submissions at the meeting highlighted that mooring operations continue to pose a risk to ships’ crews, but also shore-based mooring personnel.
Maritime 2050 is a collaboration between the Department of Transport and Maritime UK, the body for the UK maritime sector. This is the first ever long-term strategy for the UK maritime sector.
Maritime UK Chair Harry Theochari said: “For the first time the maritime sector has a real long-term strategy – setting out what government and industry will do to position the UK as the world’s leading maritime nation over the coming decades in an increasingly competitive global context. The global ocean economy will double in value to $3trn by 2030. Competitor maritime nations are hungry for the prize, and Maritime 2050 will ensure that the UK is best-placed to capitalise.
A former Coastguard with a wealth of experience has been appointed to the vital role of Secretary of State’s Representative (SOSREP) for Maritime Salvage & Intervention, which oversees the response to accidents at sea.
Stephan Hennig had previously been working with the Maritime & Coastguard Agency’s Counter Pollution Branch since 2012 and was appointed Deputy to the SOSREP in 2017.
A crewman from the Liberian registered general cargo vessel, SMN Explorer, died when he was crushed by a falling hatch cover. The crewman was part of a working party stowing cargo slings used for the discharge of the ship’s cargo. The accident occurred when the crewman climbed up the inside of the open hatch cover after its locking pins had been removed.
The accident was the result of procedural inadequacies and a lapse of supervision. The investigation identified that the vessel’s safety management system was immature and the safety culture on board the vessel was weak. Risk assessments had not been conducted for routine tasks and a safe system of work had not been developed for opening and closing the forecastle (fo’c’s’le) stowage space hatch cover.