One of the most eye-catching and devastating incidents of recent times – and totally avoidable – involved the grounding and subsequent breakup of the MV Wakashio. The tragic event caused immense environmental damage in and around the Mauritius area. Five years on, and the Court of Investigation has now issued its report into the grounding of M/V Wakashio which ran aground off Mauritius on 25 July 2020, spilling about 1,000 tons of fuel oil.
Synopsis
On the 25th of July 2020 at 19:26, the motor vessel M/V Wakashio, a cape size bulk carrier of 203,130 MT DWT and length 295.95 m, ran aground off the southeast of Mauritius near Pointe D’Esny at position 20° 26.6’ S and 57° 44.6’ E while en route to Tubarão port in Brazil. Immediately prior to the grounding, the Chief Officer, the Captain, and the Chief Engineer were on the bridge trying to access the internet through the Mauritius telecommunications network. The Deck Cadet, who was on lookout duty, had also been allowed to leave his post.
At the time of the accident, the Chief Officer was on duty on the bridge, with his main responsibility being to ensure a safe navigational watch. Evidence before this Court of Investigation established that access to mobile network communications to contact family took precedence over his primary duty.
Neither the Chief Officer nor the Master realized the vessel was heading straight onto the reefs, as they failed to properly assess the ship’s position while approaching dangerously close to the southeast coast of Mauritius. This failure resulted from improper monitoring of navigational equipment, which was either overlooked or not used to its full potential. Additional contributing factors included the absence of a large-scale chart for the region, over-reliance on an over-zoomed small-scale Electronic Navigation Chart on the ECDIS, and the consumption of liquor by the Master on the bridge.
In the following days, the vessel was exposed to stormy weather. Salvors attempted to stabilize her by filling hold No. 8 with seawater on the 2nd of August. Cracks developed just forward of the accommodations, followed by multiple hull fractures. Eventually, the vessel broke into two parts, causing a spill of heavy oil estimated at 1,000 T.
Findings
The 300 m long ship was in ballast condition with freeboard of around 14 m. The area exposed to the SE trade winds at the grounding location was quite extensive at about 4200 m². Furthermore, the sea condition was bad with swells up to 3 m. This caused the vessel to shift over 750 metres of coral reefs in a northeasterly direction resulting in further hull and machinery damage.
The attempt of Salvage to stabilize the vessel by ballasting cargo holds Nos 2, 4 and 8 did not succeed. Starting with cargo hold no 8 resulted in trimming the vessel further by the stern and caused more pounding damage in way of the engine room which was eventually breached and tidal by Wednesday 05 August.
The ship could have been towed away during high tide in the first week following the grounding, as at 31st July 2020 one third of the stern was still in good water (NEOC Situation Report No 17 dated 02 August 2020). Unfortunately, there were no salvage tugs available in the area and Mauritius Port Authority was reluctant to provide tug assistance as the port would have had to be closed due to unavailability of tugs.
The local Authorities (NCG & Shipping) did not dispatch their Officers on board to make their own assessment of the condition of the ship and carry out an oil spill risk assessment. They relied instead on the reports of the ship’s Master and the Salvage Master. They claimed that they were not authorized by the Ministry of Health to do so due to COVID regulations in force at that time. It is to be noted that the vessel had been at sea for eleven days at the time of grounding and the crew had undergone PCR tests by the Health Authority on 28 July 2020 and were found to be Covid-negative.
The Naval Architect used the values of allowable still water bending moments and shear forces for port intact conditions as reference to determine whether the calculated Shearing Forces (SF) and Bending Moments (BM sagging or hogging) as per his Condition Report of 31 July 2020 were within limits (Annex VI – Allowable Still Water Bending Moment And Shearing Force). According to this report, 35.3% of the maximum allowable BM (sagging) had been attained at Frame Nos 69 about one metre aft of the forward bulkhead of Cargo Hold No 9 and 62.9% of the maximum allowable SF had been attained at Frame 122 about one metre aft of the forward bulkhead of Cargo Hold No 6. It is to be noted that the ship broke into two sections in the way of Cargo Holds Nos 8 and 9. The first bulkhead to buckle was the aft bulkhead of Cargo Hold No 9.
By the time the Salvage tugs AHT Expedition and AHT Summit arrived on site, it was too late as the vessel had already sustained extensive hull and machinery damage.
The Director of Shipping did not receive any oil spill risk assessment prior to the oil spill. It was only after the spill that he received a copy of the Salvage Plan issued on Friday 07 August. A copy of this plan was subsequently produced by the Director of Shipping. According to this plan, the risk assessment for oil spill was very high (Annex IX – Extracts from Salvage Plan dated 07 August 2020).
Analysis
Smit Salvage was aware that the chances of salvage were rather slim due to the fact that the ship being in ballast condition was exposed to SE winds and swells and salvage tugs were not available in the area at that time. They thus invoked the Scopic Clause upon signing the LOF 2020 on Sunday 25 August.
According to the report, the salvors had not respected their part of the contract to salve the stricken vessel since the very start of the operation. In fact the LOF form was signed on the 26th July but salvors were only available and attended on board on 31st of July, losing precious time for a successful outcome. Further down the line actions by salvors have not been up to the reputation pretended. It is worth mentioning here that in the case of the bulk carrier M/V Benita that grounded on 17 June 2016 in the south of Mauritius near a fish farm and the RAMSAR, immediate deployment of salvage equipment to pump out the bunker fuel oil took place promptly the next day.
It is to be noted that at the time salvors submitted their assessment report carried out between 31st July – 2nd of August 2020 to the National committee on 2nd of August 2020, the vessel had changed heading several times.
The flooding of cargo hold no. 8 coupled with the stern pounding on the seabed led to the deterioration of the longitudinal strength of the vessel while everybody was waiting for tug assistance. The salvors failed to provide a proper service by not providing tug assistance when it was really needed.
It has been seen from reports that the vessel had moved about 750 m from its initial grounding position which confirms that the vessel was at times floating, although not completely. Had adequate bollard pull been available during the time the vessel was swaying due to the combined effect of the SE trade winds and wave motion, the vessel could have been pulled out clear from the reefs or at the very least been prevented from moving, thereby ensuring her stability while waiting for the sea-going tugs on the casualty site.
Such a positive move was successful in the case of the bulk carrier M/V Benita that grounded on 17th June 2016 in the south of Mauritius when the ocean sea-going tug Ionian Sea Fos remained onsite with a tow line attached to the bulk carrier to prevent excessive movement and provide constant tension.
Contrary to M/V Benita, the casualty representative Mr Lars Tesmar stated that there were no salvage pumps on board M/V Wakashio as from day 1 and ballast pumps were used to transfer water from the engine room and to fill hold no. 8. As the vessel’s ballast pumps were under water as from midnight on 05 August 2020, only fire hoses were being used but at this height the effect was very minor.
It is worth mentioning here that the after part of the vessel is slimmer than the rest of the bulk carrier, offering less buoyant force. The low draft aft of the vessel and flooding of the engine room meant that the vessel could, as a second option, have been manoeuvred so that the aft part sits undisturbed on the sea bed, preventing an overhang of the aft part of the vessel which was getting heavier due to water ingress counterbalanced by a lesser buoyancy force resulting in a downward force. Unfortunately, the tugs to move the aft part of the vessel were not available and in that configuration with an overhang aft, the weakened aft section was bound to shear, and shearing occurred at frame F 42 forward of the engine room at the change of section.
Although 7500 mt of ballast water was pumped into hold no. 8, that was not sufficient to ground the vessel to stabilise her. Hold no. 8 finally became tidal on 3rd August at 12.30 hrs, reducing all hopes to ground the vessel as expected.
They did not inform the local Authorities that the risks of oil spill were high and that it was most urgent to:
– dispatch pumping equipment and piping by air,
– dispatch two MPA harbour tugs for towing/immobilization pending arrival of Salvage tugs,
– hire the local bunker barges for the transfer of the fuel bunkers.
Smit Salvage realized that they had not used their best endeavours to prevent or minimize damage to the environment as they failed to carry out an oil spill risk assessment upon arriving on the casualty site. The purpose of this initial risk assessment as per their own procedure is “to have a clear overview of the involved project risks to be managed. This is to enable all stakeholders to be in control during the whole duration of the project.” It was only after the oil spill that they submitted to the Director of Shipping a Salvage Plan showing a risk assessment matrix with rating of risk of egress of bunkers from bunker tanks as high and intolerable (Annex IX – Extract from Salvage Plan issue date 07/08/2020). This confirms that the risk assessment was done after the oil spill.
The Salvage Masters tried to cover up their failure by producing during the hearing a revised copy of the Salvage Plan backdated to 29 July 2020. In this copy, the risk of egress of bunkers from bunker tanks was deleted from the risk assessment matrix as this was not in line with their affirmation to the local Authorities that the risk of oil spill was minimal (Annex X – Extracts from Salvage Plan issue date 29 July 2020).
At the beginning of the salvage operations the worst scenario envisaged by local Authorities was a tier 1 response i.e. a spill of less than 10 T. Being given it was a known fact that a spill could occur, it is of concern that it never occurred to both the Ministry of Environment and the Shipping Division during the numerous occasions that they met or exchanged their views that it was their duty to press upon the salvors to come up with a risk assessment to ensure that the assessment be regularly reviewed and updated as the situation unfolded.
Had the local Authorities been on board after confirmation that the crew was not Covid contaminated, they would have observed that the ship was lively with the incoming seas and the stern section was pounding and the bottom shell plating was coming in contact with the reefs. They would have then realised that further damage would be sustained with deteriorating sea and weather conditions.
The obvious solution would have been to assist Salvage in hiring MPA tugs and local bunker barges timeously. However, it should be pointed out that the weather and sea conditions were deteriorating and could have affected the lightering operations.
Recommendations
The National Coast Guard Act dates back to 1988 and it has never addressed safety of navigation. This is evidenced by the inclusion of safety of navigation for the first time on the 2021 action plan. Actually, the main focus has been more on piracy & terrorism than safety of vessels, although powers available at sections 12(f) and (g) contain enabling provisions to monitor activities in our waters and to prevent activities likely to cause pollution.
It is therefore considered important to make provisions for the application of the act or creation of a legal framework to deal with safety of navigation to prevent similar incidents like M/V Wakashio. Enhancement of the capability of the NCG to include surveillance and monitoring of vessel traffic in our near coastal waters at section 6 of the National Coast Guard Act would be beneficial instead of creating another civilian body to scrutinise our coastal waters as the infrastructure already exists at the NCG posts.
All high-ranking officers responsible for the supervision of coastal radar surveillance systems operations need to receive training in the objectives of radar tracking and monitoring to ensure that they are fully conversant with the routines of radar surveillance and can oversee the work of their juniors.
A plan of maintenance of communication and surveillance equipment at NCG operation room and outward posts should be drawn up to ensure that equipment is fully operational at all times and to be able to plan in advance the purchase of replacement parts.
It is recommended that Mauritius pursues its efforts through the Commission de l’Ocean Indien (COI) for the establishment of a solid regional response and preparedness related to pollution prevention of marine pollution which is part of the Maritime security architecture developed under the MASE program funded by international bodies like EU, IMO and UN.
During an incident of the scale of M/V Wakashio it has been clear that there are too many committees, overlapping of responsibilities and each ministry having its own agenda. As a matter of fact there is a need to reach consensus, delaying proper decisions. It is therefore important to get away from the present situation by having a good regulatory framework for co-ordination of unified activities instead of fragmented decisions.
At present there is no obligation for passing vessels to establish contact with local Authorities. It should be made mandatory to call NCG or Harbour Radio to interrogate vessels when sailing near the coast at 12 nm or 24 nm.
Given the number of northbound and southbound vessels passing off the island every day, the local authority should ideally have at their disposal a salvage tug stationed at Port Louis to tow vessels which are no longer under command (machinery breakdown / crewing issues) away from land.
This would be an expensive option as the hire rates of such tugs are rather on the high side. The best option would be to upgrade the tug fleet of MPA and include a harbour tug of sufficient bollard pull and equipped with towing equipment to assist in salvage of vessels in the territorial waters. This tug should be manned round the clock and normally operate as a harbour tug. The crew of this tug should be trained in towing of vessels.
Arrangements should be made to ensure that sufficient and adequate resources are available by sea and by air to promptly assist when a casualty occurs at sea. Fast intervention crafts of sturdy construction should be readily available nearby probable casualty sites so that they can be deployed within short notice.
Download and read the report: Report Court of Investigation-MV Wakashio