Transport Malta has released a report into a fatality on board bulk carrier Yuka D while it was at anchor off Paradip, India on 22 May 2024.
The vessel Yuka D discharged a cargo of steel scrap at the port of Chittagong, Bangladesh, using its cargo cranes operated by shore personnel. Upon completion of unloading operations, the vessel proceeded in ballast to the port of Paradip, India, to load a new cargo of steel slabs. Yuka D arrived and anchored off Paradip on 20 May 2024. On the morning of 22 May 2024, while still at anchor awaiting berthing instructions, two ordinary seafarers were assigned to clean the interiors of the cargo crane cabins, which required cleaning following the cargo operations at Chittagong.
Approximately 30 minutes into the task, one of the seafarers fell from the cabin of cargo crane no. 1 to the cross-deck between cargo holds 1 and 2 – a fall of about 12 metres. Crew members responded immediately, but the seafarer had sustained fatal injuries. The safety investigation concluded that the likely cause of the fall was the failure of the sealing mechanism of the bottom window in the cabin of cargo crane no. 1. As the Company had already implemented corrective safety measures, no further recommendations have been issued.
Cause of the fall
It was clear that OS 1 fell through the bottom window of cargo crane no. 1 cabin. Considering that the protective grating above the bottom window pane had been removed, it is likely that OS 1 was either cleaning, or had intended to clean the bottom window glass pane, which gave way when he put either some or all of his weight on it.
Since no technical information on the design load on the glass was available, and in the absence of signs of considerable damage to the double C-channel rubber seal (which could have caused it to slip off), the safety investigation was unable to determine the exact reason why the glass gave way. In this regard, the safety investigation did not exclude that, either:
- The glass pane may have been previously damaged and it failed under the weight / partial weight of OS 1;
- Wear down in the thickness of the steel plate of the crane cabin floor (particularly around the double C-channel rubber seal of the bottom window), due to corrosion, and which may have resulted in the slipping of the double C-channel rubber seal and glass, possibly when OS 1 applied pressure to it; or
- The double C-channel rubber seal holding the bottom glass in place failed under the weight / partial weight of the OS and consequently, the glass fell, followed by the OS.
The safety investigation had been informed that there were no witnesses to the accident. The glass pane was found shattered on the deck and therefore it was not possible to determine the exact dynamics, i.e., whether the glass had shattered under the weight / partial weight of the OS, or when it hit the deck.
During the safety investigation visit on board, several parts of all four cargo cranes, including their cabins, showed signs of corrosion. A close-up look of the area inside the cabin, and the numerous photos taken at the time of the on board investigation, did not reveal significant corrosion and heavy wastage (e.g., due to pitting corrosion) around the perimeter of the bottom glass pane, which could have suggested to the crew / crane operator that the assembly may have been compromised. However, this possibility was not excluded.
The possible failure of the double C-channel rubber seal assembly was of specific interest to the safety investigation. In view of their locations, it was not abnormal for the double C-channel rubber seals not to be included in the planned maintenance regimes on board, even if their location, exposed to the elements, could have made them prone to loss of original chemical and physical properties. The accident referred to in sub-section 1.12.1, serves as a stark reminder that certain areas on board are often overlooked and excluded from the vessel maintenance programmes implemented on board – an oversight that can have serious consequences.
In accordance with the crane manufacturer manual, the glass pane was made of tempered glass, rather than normal glass. Tempered glass is toughened glass and is approximately five times stronger and more durable than normal glass. However, tempered glass does not necessarily equate to walk-on glass. For instance, walk-on glass is normally between 10 mm and 20 mm thick and often fitted with multiple layers. Moreover, and equally important, was the support assembly of the glass pane, because the structural support also had to take the weight of the glass pane and the person walking on the glass (if so designed).
The safety investigation is of the view that neither the (rubber) support, nor the glass pane were designed to be walked on, considering that only the double C-channel rubber seal held the glass pane in place. The safety investigation did not exclude that as much as the sealing arrangement would have been more than adequate to serve its intended purpose of holding the glass pane in place, it may have not been designed to take additional load (weight). Therefore, irrespective of how strong tempered glass is, the safety investigation was of the view that the sealing arrangement was not designed to take additional weight, over and above the weight of the glass pane.
The fall of the OS from the cabin of cane no. 1 was captured on CCTV, albeit from a significant distance. Figure 20 is a screen grab of what is believed to be the window pane falling, seconds before the OS fell through the opening inside the cabin. Whilst the distance between the CCTV camera and crane no. 1 was significant, the camera seemed to capture the window pane and the rubber seal falling from the cabin6. If that was the case, then the CCTV camera would have captured what appears to be an intact glass pane, i.e., the glass pane and the rubber sealing assembly would have been pushed out through the opening, in the bottom of the crane no. 1 cabin.
Moreover, the way the OS was captured falling to the main deck, suggested that rather than intentionally stepping into the opening, he may have been on his knees behind the window before he fell through the opening at some point, because of the position of his centre of gravity, whilst kneeling down to clean the window.
Read the full report on the Yuka D, including the safety actions taken during the investigation, here: MV YUKA D Final Report