The number and impact of major and total hull losses has remained low since 2016, a trend that has continued into the first half of 2018, according to figures by the Nordic Association of Marine Insurers (Cefor).
The overall claims frequency continues its positive trend and stabilizes at a relatively low level, and total loss frequency reached a minimum again in the first half of 2018, and continues thus the last year’s trend with some oscillation at low levels.
Accidents in enclosed spaces onboard ships have been a source of serious injuries and fatalities for many years, yet still they happen. Analysis of the accidents shows failure to follow established procedures many times leads to such accidents and incidents. In this video published by Gard P&I Club, you will see Gard’s former surveyor, Alf Martin Sandberg’s story, who could have lost his life when he entered Click to w void space onboard a barge without checking the atmosphere inside the space first.
This story is a real-life reminder that accidents can happen in any enclosed spaces. For this reason, every precaution should be taken both before to entry and while inside an enclosed space, and that even trained professionals make mistakes.
The booklet is the fourth in a series of coming guides produced by The American Club, which deal with matters of safety, protection of the marine environment and maritime security.
The American Club has recently published a helpful new guide which focuses on Safety Management Systems. The aim is to assist both seafarers and shoreside personnel in understanding the basic principles of how to implement local and international safety management systems.
The booklet is the fourth in a series of coming guides produced by The American Club, which deal with matters of safety, protection of the marine environment and maritime security.
A safety management system – or SMS – is a proven and essential tool for achieving loss prevention success for both international shipping under the International Safety Management (ISM) Code and U.S. inland waterway operators and on non-compulsory vessels under the U.S. Code of Federal Regulation Subchapter M, towing vessels safety management system option for compliance.
The examination showed that the damaged nitrogen cylinder had suffered significant corrosion at the point of failure.
The Bahamas Maritime Authority issued a safety alert regarding the potential serious risk for safety on board a ship where nitrogen cylinder are used as a stored kinetic energy system for launching lifeboats. This alert was issued after the authority obtained information from an ongoing maritime incident investigation conducted by the Transport Accident Investigation Commission, New Zealand.
The vessel had hydraulically powered davits with six power packs, three on each side of the vessel. A stored energy system consisted of a piston accumulator and a bank of four high pressure (180-210 Bar) nitrogen cylinders were fitted to each lifeboat launching davit.
In February 2017, one of the nitrogen cylinders of a stored energy system onboard exploded while being topped up to maintain the correct pressure. A crew member died as a result of the explosion. The findings of the investigation indicate that significant corrosion affected the structural integrity of the cylinder.
All cargo, whether carried on or under deck, should be stowed and secured in accordance with the vessel’s Cargo Securing Manual as approved under Regulation 5.6 of Chapter VI of the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention.
The Australian Maritime Safety Authority has published a marine notice, reminding vessel owners, operators, masters and surveyors of the importance of stowing cargo in accordance with the approved Cargo Securing Manual arrangements and regulations.
All cargo, whether carried on or under deck, should be stowed and secured in accordance with the vessel’s Cargo Securing Manual as approved under Regulation 5.6 of Chapter VI of the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention. This includes the way in which cargo is secured and the weight distribution of cargo within the stow.
A sea anchor is a vital component to a rescue boat, reducing the likelihood of it drifting away or spinning around, and keeps it steady in the wind.
As more people are heading out to sea over summer, safety both onboard and overboard is under the spotlight. For this reason, an ISO has been updated for the effectiveness of sea anchors for rescue boats known as ‘ISO 17339:2018, Ships and marine technology – Life saving and fire protection – Sea anchors for survival craft and rescue boats.’
A sea anchor is a vital component to a rescue boat, reducing the likelihood of it drifting away or spinning around, and keeps it steady in the wind. The updated ISO for the performance and safety of sea anchors brings them in line with the IMO’s International Life-Saving Appliance Code.
The International Life-Saving Appliance Code prescribes the carriage and use of sea anchors for survival craft and rescue boats, yet the revised recommendation on testing of lifesaving appliances does not provide requirements of performance and testing procedure for the sea anchors. This document addresses those areas, which the IMO recommendation does not address, in order to enable consistent implementation by maritime Administrations.
The COI reports operational limitations which may have been exceeded while the voyage took place.
The US Coast Guard released the Certificate of Inspection (COI) for the ‘Stretch Duck 07’, the amphibious tour boat that sunk in Table Rock Lake, Missouri on July 2018 with the loss of 17 lives.
The COI reports operational limitations which may have been exceeded while the voyage took place. The limitation included limits on permissible weather and surface conditions.
It also indicates that the boat’s stability letter was issued on March 2009, and its last “drydock” was carried out in January 2017. Its operations were to occur in Table Rock Lake and nearby Lake Taneycomo, and it was not permitted to operate on the water “when winds exceed thirty-five (35) miles per hour, and/or the wave height exceeds two (2) feet”.
Maritime NZ describes a fire in the cargo hold of a container ship caused by the heat from a 500 watt light bulb as the ship was berthed in port on New Zealand’s East Coast in late 2017.
Maritime NZ has published its Lookout report. In it they present a range of of maritime casualties, offering some clear lessons that have been learnt. In this incident, Maritime NZ describes a fire in the cargo hold of a container ship caused by the heat from a 500 watt light bulb as the ship was berthed in port on New Zealand’s East Coast in late 2017.
The cargo hold fire incident
The floodlight was unintentionally left on after the hold was filled with timber packs. Some of the timber was destroyed in the fire and other packs charred, but the ship suffered only cosmetic damage. No-one was injured.
The cut timber had been loaded during the day and the 148 metre vessel was due to sail at the change of tide, when the cargo hold fire alarm sounded just before midnight.
From January 2021, AMSA is imposing regulation that float-free EPIRBs will be mandatory on certain types of commercial vessel. This change to safety requirements is in response to tragic incidents in which commercial vessels sank quickly and the master and crew were not able to deploy their EPIRB in time.
A float-free auto-activating EPIRB can send a call for help within minutes of being submerged in water without any action by the crew. As AMSA General Manager of Standards Brad Groves said, float-free EPIRBs offer significant safety advantages for crew and passengers on vessels in distress.
Capt Yves Vandenborn, AFNI, Director of Loss Prevention at the Standard P&I Club, based in Singapore, writing in The Standard Club P&I’s bulletin addresses the International Safety Management Code on the occasion of its twentieth birthday. Twenty years and five amendments later after the Code came into effect in 1998, Mr Vandenborn examines its course so far and what, in his opinion, needs to be done in order to become more effective.
Background
The International Safety Management Code was born out of a series of serious shipping accidents in the 1980s, the worst of which was the roll-on roll-off ferry Herald of Free Enterprise which capsized at Zeebrugge in March 1987, killing 193 of its 539 passengers and crew. The cause of these accidents was a combination of human error on board and management failings on shore. The Herald of Free Enterprise public enquiry report concluded that ‘From top to bottom the body corporate was infected with the disease of sloppiness’.
What followed was a much needed change in maritime safety administration. In October 1989, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted new Guidelines on Management for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention giving operators a ‘framework for the proper development, implementation and assessment of safety and pollution prevention management in accordance with good practice’. Following industry feedback, the guidelines became the ISM code in November 1993 and were incorporated in a new chapter IX of the IMO’s 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) in May 1994, and became mandatory for companies operating certain types of ships from 1 July 1998. Continue reading “What next as the International Safety Management Code turns 20?”
Following recent media reports about non-working, imported carbon monoxide (CO) alarms sold on internet shopping sites, the Boat Safety Scheme (BSS) is cautioning boaters that choosing the right CO alarm is an especially critical decision as boats can fill in minutes, sometimes seconds, with lethal levels of the highly toxic gas.
At 2133 on 12 September 2017, while approaching Yarmouth, Isle of Wight, the ro-ro passenger ferry Wight Sky suffered a catastrophic failure of one of its Volvo Penta D16 main propulsion engines, followed by a fire. The fire was brought under control in less than 2 minutes, but the vessel’s engineer, who had been standing near the engine, suffered serious burn injuries to his hands and face. Although he was discharged from hospital 7 days later, he was subsequently diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and had not returned to work at the time of publishing this report.
